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Many thanks to the Editors of The European Journal for organising this 
symposium, and to all the reviewers for the work involved in grappling 
with my arguments.
I. INFORMATIVE DESIGNATORS AND PROPERTY DUALISM
I claimed that the history (in an objective sense) of the world is just the 
succession of events (which – briefly – are the instantiations of properties 
in substances at times), and that we can tell it in many different ways by 
cutting the world up into substances and properties in different ways; but 
that to do so we need to pick out substances and properties by informative 
[rigid] designators. I defined an ‘informative designator’ as follows:
For a  rigid designator of a  thing to be an  informative designator it 
must be the case that anyone who knows what the word means (that 
is, has the linguistic knowledge of how to use it) knows a  certain set 
of conditions necessary and sufficient (in any possible world) for 
a  thing to be that thing (whether or not he can state those conditions 
in words.) Two informative designators are logically equivalent if and 
only if they are associated with logically equivalent sets of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. To ‘know’ these conditions for the application of 
a designator – as I shall understand this expression – just is to be able 
(when favourably positioned, with faculties in working order, and not 
subject to illusion) to recognize where the informative designator (or, 
if it is defined in words, the words by which it is defined) applies and 
where it does not and to be able to make simple inferences to and from 
its application. (Mind, Brain, and Free Will, p. 12)
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I  illustrated the difference between an  informative designator such 
as ‘red’ and an uninformative one such as ‘water’ (as understood in the 
eighteenth century). We know what it is for a thing to be red because we 
can always recognise red things under the stated conditions; but in the 
eighteenth century when to be ‘water’ meant to have the same essence 
as the stuff in our rivers and seas, we could only recognize water when 
it was in our rivers and seas. With aid of this distinction I  argue that 
we would leave out an important part of the history of the world unless 
we included in that history both pure mental events (sensations, beliefs, 
etc.) to which subjects have privileged access and physical events which 
are publicly accessible events (or events which entail the occurrence of 
events of both kinds), and both pure mental substances and physical 
substances (or substances which entail the occurrence of substances of 
both kinds).
I  have quoted my definition of ‘informative designator’ at length, 
because it seems to me that neither Lynne Rudder Baker nor William 
Jaworski have understood it fully or grasped its significance. Baker’s first 
objection (p. 8) to the utility of this concept is that since on my view 
that ‘I’ is an informative designator which designates a mental substance, 
everyone who uses ‘I’ competently should believe that they are a mental 
substance, and of course they don’t. But Baker has not appreciated the 
sentence of my definition which states that to ‘know’ the conditions for 
the application of the designator ‘as I shall understand this expression’ just 
is to be able to recognize when it applies and when it does not; knowing 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a  thing to be that thing is 
‘knowing the nature of what I am talking about’. I use the point about 
‘I’, together with a claim about the logical possibility of certain thought 
experiments, to argue over several pages for the truth of the philosophical 
thesis that I am a mental substance. To do this I use arguments which, 
even though in my view they are sound, not everyone will believe to 
be sound, and so not everyone will believe the philosophical thesis. Yet 
clearly someone can know something without believing all its logical 
consequences. Jaworski has a similar general worry – he writes (p. 24) 
that ‘even if I am necessarily right about what “I” refers to, I can still be 
wrong about what essential properties I have’. But on my definition of 
knowing a set of conditions necessary and sufficient for the application 
of a  designator, ‘being necessarily right’ about what it refers to is 
knowing one set of essential properties for being me. There are many 
different logically equivalent sets of necessary and sufficient conditions 
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for anything to be what it is; I only need to know one particular set in 
order to use the word ‘I’ correctly. But knowing one set of conditions for 
applying ‘I’ is quite sufficient to rule out the possession of any physical 
properties as metaphysically necessary – in virtue of my arguments to 
show that physical and pure mental properties and so the existence of 
physical and pure mental substances never entail each other. Of course 
there may be physical substances with physical properties which are 
causally necessary and sufficient for my existence – but that is irrelevant 
to my argument.
Then Baker claims (p. 8) that she knows how to use the word ‘arthritis’ 
but doesn’t know necessary and sufficient conditions for its application. 
But the meaning of a  technical term is determined by a  ‘group of 
experts’ (my p. 10), and on the assumption that the experts do know the 
necessary and sufficient conditions it will be an informative designator; 
otherwise it is an  ‘uninformative designator’. And then Baker claims 
(p. 8) that she does not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for 
something to be ‘red’ because of doubt about whether reddish-orange 
things and such like are red. But a  competent language speaker will 
know that a reddish-orange thing is a borderline case of being red and 
so (given the falsity of the epistemic theory of vagueness) will know that 
the necessary and sufficient conditions for being red are not satisfied, 
and will also know that the necessary and sufficient conditions for being 
not-red are not satisfied. Baker is mistaken in supposing (p. 8) that on 
my view whether a word is an ‘informative designator’ normally varies 
with the speaker. My view is that words have a ‘correct use’ (my p. 17) in 
a language; and normally whom or what is designated by a word is the 
same whoever uses it. The correct use today of ‘water’ by everyone is to 
designate H2O. However what is designated by an indexical clearly varies 
with the speaker  – what ‘you’ or ‘here’ designate varies with who use 
these words, when, and where. So what ‘I’ designates, while being always 
an  informative designator, varies with the speaker. And, I  argued, the 
correct use of ‘I’ or of my own name by myself is that of an informative 
designator; but that the correct use of my name by someone else is that of 
an uninformative designator. This is the sole case where whether a word is 
an ‘informative designator’ varies with the speaker. ‘Richard Swinburne’ 
as used by me is an informative designator, whereas as used by others 
it ‘is an uninformative designator’ (my p. 165). This is because ‘Richard 
Swinburne’ is used to refer to the actual person who has a certain body. 
But others do not know the necessary and sufficient conditions for being 
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that person – since that person could now exist without a body or in 
a different body; and others would not necessarily be able to recognize 
that person under those conditions. They apply the word, as people 
applied ‘water’ in the eighteenth century, on the basis of conditions which 
are not necessary and sufficient for being that person. I also use ‘Richard 
Swinburne’ to refer to the actual person who has a certain body. But I, 
being aware of myself, am in a position to know who that person is, and 
so to know those necessary and sufficient conditions for being Richard 
Swinburne. I alone necessarily would be able to recognize myself now if 
I had a different body, or if I did not have a body at all. I conclude that 
none of Baker’s criticisms of the utility of the concept of an informative 
designator have any force.
Jaworski has a similar package of objections to the way I apply the 
concept of informative designator. He claims (pp. 21-22), that showing 
that ‘red’ and ‘reflects light of such-and-such wavelengths’ are not logically 
equivalent and so pick out different properties, does not show that one 
is mental and the other is physical. He is correct in this claim. ‘Red’ is 
in my sense a  physical property, because the substance in which it is 
instantiated – a surface – does not have privileged access to its instantiation 
in it; all observers (when favourably positioned, with faculties in working 
order, and not subject to illusion) have equal access to whether it is 
instantiated; and of course ‘reflects light of such-and-such wavelengths’ 
is also a  physical property. I  introduced this example in chapter 1 to 
illustrate how we need to distinguish between properties  – by their 
informative designators not being logically equivalent; and I deliberately 
chose an example which was not an example where one property was 
mental and the other property was physical. But having introduced the 
concept of an  informative designator, I  proceeded to argue that there 
are innumerable properties individuated by informative designators 
which are such that the substance in whom they are instantiated has 
privileged access to their instantiation, and which are therefore not the 
same properties as ones which are such that the substance in which they 
are instantiated does not have privileged access to their instantiation. 
Contrary to Jaworski, I  do not merely ‘tacitly endorse’ (p.  22) ‘modes 
of presentation’; I explicitly claim that they are themselves properties – 
‘a mode of presentation ... is just as much a real characteristic of any object 
as any property’ (my p. 26). My objection was to introducing into our 
ontology a category of ‘mode of presentation’ separate from the category 
of property. Certainly some properties might be distinguished from 
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each other by different modes of presentation (that is, properties distinct 
from the properties which they were picking out), but to suppose that all 
properties could be so picked out would lead to an infinite regress; some 
properties (those having informative designators) must be recognizable 
as what they are without intermediaries. However all substances, unlike 
all properties, may be picked out by different modes of presentation (i.e. 
different properties); and so I am not denying what Jaworski has to say 
(p. 22) about ‘Cicero’ and ‘Tully’ with the caveat that (except for their use 
by Cicero himself) they serve as uninformative designators.
Jaworski claims (p. 20) – correctly – that we may find ourselves in 
unusual conditions and call something ‘red’ which we would not call 
‘red’ under ideal conditions and come later to recognize our mistake. 
Then he goes on to claim that if ‘red’ is like this, then it is possible that 
redness may be identical to a  surface property whose essence we do 
not know even though we can competently use ‘red’ to refer to objects 
having it. But I cannot see why that is supposed to follow. To repeat – 
words mean what competent language users mean by them. And in my 
view ‘red’ is used to designate a  certain aspect of the way things look 
(to most people); and the way things look is the sole determinant of 
whether they are red. If (implausibly) I  am mistaken and ‘red’ is not 
used in that way, then we would need another word which is used in 
this way to designate that aspect (or words which entail that aspect) 
if we are to give a  full description of the world. Jaworski suggests that 
while all speakers understand ‘red’ in the same sense, some competent 
speakers might pick out an object as ‘red’ by the way it looks, and other 
speakers might pick it out by the wavelengths of the light it reflects. ‘Red’ 
would then have two criteria for its application, each sufficient and only 
disjunctively necessary; red objects could be picked out by either of two 
separate properties. But again if that’s how ‘red’ works then  – to fully 
describe the world – we need an informative designator for each of the 
two properties. My definition that two rigidly designating predicates 
which are not logically equivalent designate different properties is not 
(p.  22) a  ‘tendentious assumption about properties’; it is a  definition 
which I explicitly provide since there are alternative criteria which one 
could choose to use for the identity of properties. I chose this criterion 
because with the aid of it we can tell the whole history of the world by 
listing only a set of events (instantiations of properties in substances at 
times) which entail all events which ever occur. I  am not denying, as 
Jaworski seems to suppose (pp. 23-24), that properties and substances 
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may have essential properties of which we are unaware; but I do claim 
that – if so – those essential properties must be entailed by the ones of 
which we are aware when we pick them out by informative designators. 
To deny that is to use different criteria for ‘same property’ from the one 
which I have good reason to propose.
II. COMPOSITE SUBSTANCES
Baker criticises my principle of the identity of composites. One way to 
express the principle, she claims (pp. 9-10), is ‘there is no more to any 
substance than its parts (e.g. fundamental particles) and the way those 
parts are arranged’. But – crucially my principle, as I stated it (my p. 35) 
is ‘there cannot (logically) be two things which have all the same parts 
having all the same properties, arranged in the same way’. ‘Having all the 
same properties’, is crucial (and indeed makes ‘arranged in the same way’ 
redundant). Among the properties of a thing are (my p. 5) its relations to 
other things including (see e.g. my p. 33) properties of spatio-temporal 
continuity with earlier things. Hence Baker’s drinkalator – carburettor 
example (pp. 9-10) does not count against my principle. All the parts of 
a drinkalator have the property of being part of a device used for making 
soft drinks; and the parts of a carburettor do not have this property. All 
that is ruled out by my principle is that the world could be different if 
instead of one such machine there was another such machine made of 
the same parts with the same properties (including the same past-related 
properties) arranged in the same way. Then I claimed that we can tell the 
story of the ship of Theseus either by using the ‘same planks’ criterion or 
by using the ‘gradual replacement’ criterion for the identity of the ship 
‘without anything being omitted’. Baker objects (p. 9) that which later 
ship is the original ship makes a great difference to the history of the 
world, because it affects who owns which ship. But on both accounts it 
may be part of the story that the courts determined which of these ships 
was the ship of Theseus. But (barring the – to my mind – implausible 
epistemic theory of vagueness) the courts did not discover the answer 
to a deep metaphysical issue; they merely determined which criterion 
should be used for determining who owned which of the two subsequent 
ships. Once we know what happened to all the planks and what the courts 
decided, we can still tell the story in two mutually entailing ways. I doubt 
if the decision of a court (e.g, that ‘same planks’ determines same ship) 
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is enough to settle how the expression ‘same ship’ should normally be 
used; but even if it does settle it, we can still tell the whole story by using 
a  different criterion (e.g., gradual replacement) from that used by the 
courts, adding that the courts called the ship formed of the same planks 
the original ship and so determined that the owner of the original ship 
now owned, not the original ship but the ship formed of the same planks.
III. MENTAL SUBSTANCES
A mental substance is – on my definition – one for the possession of which 
some mental property is essential. I argue that we humans are mental 
substances because we co-experience at a time and over time different 
mental properties. Baker (pp.  10-11) outlines correctly the structure 
of my argument from co-experience at one time (e.g. of sensations of 
different kinds), which I call the argument from the synchronic unity of 
the human person. She doubts its validity because she suspects that I am 
using ‘delimit’ as a causal notion in (2), and that (2) will only support the 
ontological claim of (4) if it uses ‘delimit’ in a stronger sense. ‘Delimit’ 
is indeed being used in a causal sense in (2), but my claim is that the 
causal facts determine the ontological facts. What makes a  brain my 
brain (ontological fact) is that my mental events are caused by, or cause, 
events in that brain (causal fact). It then follows that if I have any physical 
properties (as Baker and almost all of us hold), then necessarily a mental 
property of mine determines that certain of my brain properties are 
(contingently, because of the causal connection) among those physical 
properties. I  claimed at this place in the discussion as elsewhere in 
the book, that we can cut the world up into substances and trace their 
continuities in different ways without leaving anything out of the history 
of the world. In particular we could regard the physical part of me as 
only a brain – after all, my brain in a vat is still me, or even as only part of 
a brain, in interaction with another substance, constituted by the rest of 
my body; and the history of the world which assumed this would entail 
and be entailed by its history described with our more normal categories. 
My point at this stage of the discussion, was that if we treat me as having 
any physical properties at all, certain brain properties must be among 
them in virtue of their causal relations to a mental property. A mental 
property determines the minimal set of physical properties which, if 
I have any physical properties, are essential if a  substance is to be me 
at all. And so, whether or not any physical properties are necessary for 
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my existence, a mental property is necessary. Jaworski (p. 25) is right to 
claim that I have to hold that ‘I have no physical properties other than 
those which are determined by my mental properties’. But – and I should 
have made this point explicit in the text – all my other physical properties 
(on our normal understanding of my physical boundaries) cause or are 
caused indirectly by (i.e. via a causal route) my brain properties which 
cause or are caused ‘immediately’ (my p. 143) by my mental properties – 
given that the causation is close enough to regard them as belonging 
to a  single organism. What makes the other physical properties mine 
is determined (immediately or indirectly) by my mental properties. 
The rest of my brain is mine because events in it cause the events which 
are the immediate causes of my sensations, and so on. Even my hair is 
mine, because it goes where my brain events cause the rest of my body, 
to which it is attached, to go. So if I had no mental properties, neither 
would I have any physical properties. If I no longer had any conscious 
events or continuing mental states (e.g. beliefs and desires which I can 
have while not being conscious, and even when in a coma), I would not 
exist – on our normal understanding of what it is for ‘me’ to exist, which 
I was trying to analyse. So I reject Jaworski’s suggestion (p. 25) that ‘the 
continued existence of some ... mentally irrelevant parts [might] be 
sufficient for my existence’. My corpse is not an existing me.
Although my argument from the diachronic unity of the human 
person is supported by my argument from its synchronic unity, it does 
not in fact need it  – contrary to Baker’s claim. In fact it consists of 
several connected arguments, none of which need the argument from 
synchronic unity. I  opened the section on diachronic unity with the 
claim that (among pure mental events, to which – see my pp. 71-72 – my 
discussion thereafter of ‘mental events’ was almost entirely confined) all 
conscious events, such as having a pain or a thought last for a period of 
time. (As Baker points out, I wrote carelessly that ‘all events take time’ 
(my p. 148); I should have written ‘all conscious events take time’.) I then 
argue that for a person to have a conscious event such as a pain lasting for 
a period (e.g. one second) is for that person to have a pain lasting for the 
first half of that period and also a pain lasting for the second half of that 
period. In being aware of one’s one-second pain, one is aware of oneself as 
experiencing pain for the first half of that period and then experiencing 
pain for the second half of the period, and so of oneself continuing over 
time. Yet (given – as I argue later -that ‘I’ is an informative designator) 
that I have a pain (or any other conscious event) does not entail and is 
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not entailed by any physical event at all. So the substance involved in that 
event (myself) could – it is metaphysically possible – exist even if there 
were no physical events. That entails that I am a pure mental substance. 
What applies to me applies to other humans, and since the argument is 
simply an argument from a being being conscious to it having a soul as 
its one essential part, it applies to any conscious being. But all that that 
argument shows is that I  have a  soul as my one essential part for the 
‘specious present’ of one conscious event. I  then extend the argument 
to show that I have a soul as my one essential part for as long as I have 
a series of overlapping conscious events. I then appeal to various thought 
experiments to show the logical possibility and then the metaphysical 
possibility of any conscious being continuing to exist over intervals of 
not being conscious without that consciousness being dependent on 
any particular brain and then on any brain at all. Hence being conscious 
entails being such as not  – metaphysically  – to need any physical 
properties in order to exist. Since consciousness entails being a  pure 
mental substance, not being a pure mental substance entails not being 
conscious. James Dew (p. 31) calls it an ‘unstated assumption’ that ‘it is 
impossible for purely physical organisms to have conscious experiences’. 
I think that the argument for that is sufficiently explicit in the arguments 
from synchronic and diachronic unity summarized above to be found in 
my chapter 6.
Dew misunderstands my thought experiment in which a tenth of my 
brain is replaced each year until after ten years none of the original brain 
remains. He asks (p. 32) ‘why couldn’t it ... happen’ that the same ‘stream 
of consciousness – a first person perspective – is maintained by an ever-
changing physical organism’? If he means by the ‘same stream’, a ten-year 
stream of overlapping conscious experiences, that seems unlikely in view 
of the human need for sleep, some of which seems to be non-conscious. 
But if it did happen, the resulting person would indeed be the same person 
as the original person. But given a few intervals of non-consciousness in 
such an experiment, as I wrote, it still seems logically possible that the 
resulting person would be the same as the original person. But, I go on 
to say, it seems ‘also logically possible’ that the resulting person would 
not be the original person. I then go on to argue that what is logically 
possible is in this case also metaphysically possible. I then conclude that 
because each scenario is compatible with all the data about the physical 
parts, and the physical and mental properties of the original and resulting 
persons, by the principle of the identity of composites the final resulting 
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person would need to have a same non-physical part (the same soul) if 
he is to be the same person as the original person.
Baker summarises her own view  – a  view of which Dew writes 
approvingly – that (to quote Dew, p. 33) as well as some sort of bodily 
continuity, ‘all that is necessary for the persistence of the persons is 
continuity of first-person perspective’ which is ‘the activity one has to 
think of herself as herself ’. The continuity of ‘first-person perspective’ is 
explicated as the continuity, not of a conscious thought, but of an ‘ability 
to think of herself as herself ’. But what is it for such an ability possessed 
by a  person P2 on waking up in the morning to be continuous with 
the ability possessed by the person P1 who went to sleep the previous 
evening, and whose body was continuous with the body of P2? If bodily 
continuity and/or continuity of memory and character is necessary and 
sufficient for the resulting ability to be continuous, we run into all the 
problems raised for the complex theory of personal identity by brain 
transplant thought experiments. For example, ‘continuity of first person 
perspective’ with the previous person could be possessed by more than 
one subsequent person; and so it cannot provide an answer to which (if 
either) subsequent person is the original person, and – unless personal 
identity is a matter of degree (a view which I gave arguments to reject 
on pp. 154-5), there must be an answer to this question. And the answer 
which I provide which is immune to such problems, is that ‘continuity of 
first-person perspective’ must be construed as the continuing existence 
of an indivisible part of the original person, her soul; and then, I now 
add against Baker, no one needs to ‘think of herself as herself ’ in order to 
have some primitive conscious events, e.g. sensations, and so to continue 
to exist. Peter van Inwagen’s theory, to which Dew is also sympathetic, 
that personal identity over time is constituted by the continuing life 
of a physical organism, also runs into all the problems of any complex 
theory of personal identity. To take a slightly different example, it runs 
into the problem that any answer to the inevitable question of how many 
bodily parts can be replaced how gradually for the person still to be 
the same person will seem highly arbitrary. The obvious non-arbitrary 
solution to this question is that the truth about when a person continues 
to exist is a truth over and above any truth about how many bodily parts 
have been replaced how gradually, but that the fewer parts are replaced 
and the more gradual the replacement, the more probable it is that the 
same person continues to exist.
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Both Dew and Baker are troubled by consequences of my theory. 
Dew (p. 33) claims that my theory has the ‘troubling and unfortunate 
consequence’ that we may be completely unable ‘to identify ourselves 
across time’. But I  argued that under normal circumstances (i.e. when 
brains are not split, and memory and character are continuous) it is 
‘enormously probable’ that I am the same person as any previous person 
who had the same brain. To ask for more than that is unreasonable. It is 
only under extremely abnormal circumstances that there will be a serious 
doubt about which previous person was me. And, as Dew admits, that 
there will be a serious doubt under such circumstances is no argument 
against the theory. Baker (p. 13) regards it as a disadvantage of my theory 
that ‘there is not (or rather I cannot think of) any naturalistic way that 
an immaterial mind could have come into existence’. I too cannot think 
of such a  way, but I  – unlike Baker  – am very happy to endorse this 
consequence of my theory – given what I regard as strong arguments in 
favour of that theory.
IV. FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
David Hunt has confined his comments to my views on what it is to have 
‘free will’ of the kind that makes us morally responsible. He has read my 
text very carefully – more carefully than I read some of the texts dealing 
with PAP, ‘The Principle of Alternate Possibilities’, when  – as Hunt 
points out – I represented (on my pp. 203-4) various authors as making 
a claim about free will (in my sense), whereas in fact their claim concerns 
moral responsibility. Fortunately, as Hunt kindly remarks (p.  45), this 
error (for which I apologize to my readers) makes no difference to my 
main arguments in chapter 8 that free will in my sense – an agent acting 
‘intentionally without their intentions being fully determined by prior 
causes’ (my p. 202) – is necessary for moral responsibility.
Generally Hunt is very sympathetic to my views on these topics, and 
so I am left to deal with some fairly minor issues. I stand by my argument 
that belief (that is, belief that some proposition is true) is immune to 
the will. My claim is that we cannot change our beliefs at will, that is 
immediately by a  decision. However I  wrote (p.  77) that ‘I  can try to 
brainwash myself, so as to come to hold later a certain belief specified 
in advance; but I will only succeed if I get myself to be caused to hold 
the belief at the later time by some cause, e.g some brain event, which 
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I am not at that time intentionally causing’. Pascal had a suggestion of 
a procedure for doing this – ‘taking holy water, having masses said, and 
so on. That will make you believe quite naturally’.1 This point should be 
enough to deal with Hunt’s claim that people actually do voluntarily 
change their beliefs; to do so requires a period of brainwashing and is 
not guaranteed success. Even if some, maybe most, people do not accept 
my philosophical thesis that belief that p is belief that p is more probable 
than not -p, that doesn’t show that the thesis is false! It may show only 
that some people do not fully understand the logical consequences of 
‘S believes that p’. Hunt asks for independent evidence that when we do 
an action intentionally, we always believe that it is in some way a good 
action to do. He claims (p. 43) that Augustine’s action of stealing pears 
when young, ‘didn’t fit this paradigm’. It seems to me that Augustine’s 
description of his motivation in stealing the pears does exactly fit the 
paradigm, even though Augustine himself seems to doubt it. For he writes 
of his ‘pleasure’ in stealing, and that he ‘loved’ the act, and ‘loved’ the evil 
in him. You cannot get ‘pleasure’ from something, or ‘love’ something, 
without thinking it in some respect a good thing. But however that may 
be, the passage of mine which Hunt cites concerns moral beliefs, not any 
value beliefs; ‘moral beliefs’ on my definition are (roughly) value beliefs 
about the overall goodness of actions, of a  kind overlapping with the 
views of many other actual humans; and I spell this out more carefully by 
illustrating what ‘overlap’ amounts to. Those are the kind of value beliefs 
which – I argue – are such that we are morally responsible for acting on 
them or not acting on them. My principal claim is that we could not have 
a moral belief without having some inclination to act upon it. Contrary 
to Hunt’s claim (p. 48) that I hold that we are culpable ‘only for acting 
contrary to our value beliefs’, my view is that we are culpable only for 
acting contrary to our moral beliefs; everyone has value beliefs, but not 
everyone has moral beliefs. Psychopaths – such as perhaps was Hitler – 
are not, in my view, culpable for their actions, unless they have moral 
beliefs. But of course they may be culpable for acting so often contrary to 
their moral beliefs that they ceased to have any.
Hunt raises two further issues about the kinds of actions for which – 
given that we have free will (in my sense) – we are morally responsible. 
The first is this: I  claimed that normally we are praiseworthy only for 
1 Blaise Pascal, Pensées, translated by A.J. Krailsheimer (London: Penguin Books, 
1966), No. 418.
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doing actions which we believe to be good but not morally obligatory; 
but that we are praiseworthy for doing actions believed obligatory only 
if we do so by overcoming strong contrary temptations (my p. 212-13). 
Analogously I added later (my p. 220), that we are not praiseworthy for 
doing an action believed good but not obligatory, if we were not subject to 
any contrary desire. Hunt rightly claims that I could have given a simpler 
account of this total view. The complexity arose, I suspect, because of my 
own doubts about the (p. 220) claim at the stage of the argument when 
I put forward the (p. 213) claim. However I stand by this view, which 
results from my reflection on the principles lying behind what I suggest 
are our intuitive judgements about many particular cases; and I do not 
find Hunt’s judgement about the woman who rushes into the burning 
building at all persuasive. She instinctively does the right thing, and so 
deserves admiration for her character from which her action inevitably 
and unthinkingly flows, but she can’t deserve any extra admiration for 
acting on that character when circumstances require it. So she doesn’t 
deserve the kind of admiration which belongs to someone who fights 
contrary temptation in order to do the right thing. And although we 
should be enormously grateful to God for our creation, I do not think 
that we should regard God as praiseworthy in the same sense as humans 
are praiseworthy, except in respect of his actions when incarnate and 
when in my view he was tempted to do and could have done less than 
the best, even though he could not have failed to fulfil his obligations.2 
The second issue concerns whether we are more blameworthy for 
successful wrongdoing than for unsuccessful wrongdoing. I  stick 
by my view that on a  libertarian account of free will it is irrational to 
hold a bomber more blameworthy when his bomb works than when it 
doesn’t. We owe reparation for the harm we cause, and the successful 
bomber will owe a lot more reparation than the unsuccessful one; but 
we must not confuse his resulting indebtedness with his being more 
blameworthy. And I mentioned (my pp. 211-12) additional reasons why 
the criminal law is right to punish successful bombers more severely 
than unsuccessful ones.
2 On the point that if God became incarnate as Jesus Christ, he could not have done 
wrong, but he could have done less than the best, and is praiseworthy for not doing less 
than the best, see my Was Jesus God? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 44-47.
